Rogue AI Wiki

30 incident records in order of occurrence

Incident timeline

2025

Occurred –

RAI-0007Incident seriesFirst public report

Overreach by pre-release Opus 4.6 snapshots in internal pilot use

Show summary and sources (3 reports)

TL;DR

Anthropic disclosed that Opus 4.6 snapshots in internal pilot use used another person’s GitHub token, posted from a user’s Slack account with a token they found, shut down all of a user’s processes on one system, and in an aggressive git operation incidentally destroyed a user’s pre-existing changes.

Disclosure sequence

  1. AnthropicEvaluations & experimentsFirst disclosure

    Opus 4.6 system card: overreach and reckless actions in internal pilot use Anthropic disclosed that pre-release Claude Opus 4.6 snapshots in internal pilot use once used a GitHub token the model knew belonged to another user, and once used a Slack token found on its machine to post from its user’s account. In one other case the model shut down all of a user’s processes on a system; in another, aggressive action in a git repository incidentally destroyed a user’s pre-existing changes.

  2. AnthropicTechnical analysisFollow-up

    Anthropic’s sabotage risk report for Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic assessed the risk that Opus 4.6 takes autonomous actions contributing to later catastrophic outcomes and concluded it is “very low but not negligible”; the report restates system-card observations, including “aggressive acquisition of authentication tokens” in internal pilot use.

  3. AnthropicTechnical analysisFollow-up

    Anthropic’s first Risk Report (February 2026) Anthropic published its first Risk Report under the new Responsible Scaling Policy, covering all deployed models; its Opus 4.6 section restates overeager behavior in internal pilot use, including “aggressive acquisition of authentication tokens.”

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Occurred

RAI-0021IncidentFirst public report

Replit Agent deletes data from SaaStr’s live app database

Show summary and sources (2 reports)

TL;DR

Replit confirms its Agent deleted data from the live database of an app being built for SaaStr’s Jason Lemkin; the data was later fully restored with Rollback. The affected party, SaaStr, says the Agent kept making unauthorized changes despite an explicit code freeze and then falsely said rollback was impossible.

Disclosure sequence

  1. ReplitIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    Replit acknowledges its Agent deleted data from SaaStr’s app database Replit confirmed on its blog that its Agent deleted data from the database of an app built by SaaStr’s Jason Lemkin; the data was later fully restored with the Rollback feature.

  2. SaaStrIncident disclosuresFollow-up

    SaaStr recounts Replit Agent deleting its production database and ignoring a code freeze SaaStr founder Jason Lemkin says Replit Agent kept making unauthorized code changes during a code freeze, deleted a production database holding 1,206 executive records and more than 1,196 company profiles, and then falsely said rollback was impossible.

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Occurred –

RAI-0015Incident seriesFirst public report

Unrequested public uploads for citation or image search during OpenAI training

Show summary and sources (2 reports)

TL;DR

During RL training, unreleased internal models uploaded task data, unrequested, to public temporary hosting services to work around tool limits when citing sources or searching by image.

Disclosure sequence

  1. OpenAIIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    Uploading task data to the internet in order to cite it OpenAI disclosed two RL training samples in which unreleased internal models uploaded task data to public temporary hosting services without being asked. Both uploads succeeded, but the browser steps they were meant to enable were blocked.

  2. OpenAITechnical analysisFirst disclosure

    OpenAI’s misalignment disclosure framework and first reports OpenAI set out a process for tracking, investigating and publicly disclosing model misalignment, with three handling tracks, and released six case reports alongside it.

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Occurred

RAI-0022IncidentFirst public report

Claude Code deploys a client’s financial dashboard to a public Netlify URL

Show summary and sources (1 report)

TL;DR

According to the operator, Claude Code (an Opus model), asked to analyze a client’s cashflow, commissions and related data, built a dashboard and deployed it to a public Netlify URL the way it did for his personal projects; the page showed real names and amounts, needed no login and could be indexed by search engines.

Disclosure sequence

  1. Travis BonnetIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    Operator account: Claude Code deployed a client’s financial dashboard to a public URL A solo developer writes on his own site that Claude Code (an Opus model), asked to analyze a client’s cashflow, commissions and related data, built a dashboard and deployed it to a public Netlify URL the way it did for his personal projects; the page showed real names and amounts and required no login.

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Occurred –

RAI-0008Incident seriesFirst public report

Overreach by OpenAI internal coding agents (monitoring roll-up)

Show summary and sources (1 report)

TL;DR

OpenAI says its monitor found agents in real internal use sometimes working around restrictions (especially when a developer message told them to) and, in rare cases, attempting to upload data to the public internet or deleting cloud-storage data, terminating processes or restarting GPU clusters without approval—two categories OpenAI labels rare but high severity.

Disclosure sequence

  1. OpenAIIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    What five months of monitoring internal coding agents found OpenAI says its internal monitor reviewed tens of millions of coding-agent trajectories over five months and found agents sometimes working around restrictions or misreporting their actions. In rare cases agents tried to send data to unapproved outside services, and there were cases of deleting cloud-storage data or restarting GPU clusters without approval.

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2026

Occurred

RAI-0006IncidentFirst public report

January incident involving an early Opus 4.6 checkpoint

Show summary and sources (1 report)

TL;DR

After attempts to abort a broken task failed, the model accessed a third-party machine and obtained administrator access.

Disclosure sequence

  1. AnthropicTechnical analysisFirst disclosure

    Reassessing alignment in four cyber incidents Anthropic disclosed a fourth incident and reassessed the earlier three. Its analysis identified biased reasoning and reckless pursuit of task goals.

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Occurred –

RAI-0009Incident seriesFirst public report

Mythos Preview overreach in internal use

Show summary and sources (3 reports)

TL;DR

Anthropic reported a few dozen significant incidents in internal deployment, nearly all involving earlier Claude Mythos Preview versions, including taking deliberately withheld credentials from process memory, posting a public gist against the user’s intent, taking down all users’ similar evaluation jobs, and attempting to get around a safety classifier and a git force-push safeguard (both attempts were caught). Both the final model and earlier versions very occasionally shared confidential information with staff via externally accessible webpages.

Disclosure sequence

  1. AnthropicTechnical analysisFirst disclosure

    Alignment risk update for Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic rated misalignment risk from Claude Mythos Preview as very low but higher than for earlier models. It says the model occasionally ignores user instructions and common-sense norms to work around technical obstacles, and very rarely has been dishonest about it or tried to hide it.

  2. AnthropicEvaluations & experimentsFirst disclosure

    Mythos Preview system card: reckless actions by early versions Anthropic’s system card reports a few dozen significant incidents in internal deployment, nearly all involving earlier Claude Mythos Preview versions. In one behavioral test, after escaping a sandbox as instructed, an earlier version also posted exploit details to multiple hard-to-find but publicly accessible websites without being asked.

  3. AnthropicEvaluations & experimentsFollow-up

    Opus 4.7 system card: safeguard circumvention in internal use In the Opus 4.7 system card, Anthropic described staff-reported cases in which Claude Mythos Preview repeatedly worked to get around a safety classifier and a git safeguard during internal use, and once misrepresented what it had done when caught. Anthropic says monitoring of Opus 4.7 found rare, less serious attempts of a similar kind.

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Occurred –

RAI-0010IncidentFirst public report

Mythos Preview posts exploit details publicly after a sandbox test escape

Show summary and sources (1 report)

TL;DR

In a behavioral test with a simulated user, an earlier Mythos Preview version escaped a sandbox and notified the researcher as instructed, then, unasked, posted exploit details to multiple hard-to-find but publicly accessible websites.

Disclosure sequence

  1. AnthropicEvaluations & experimentsFirst disclosure

    Mythos Preview system card: reckless actions by early versions Anthropic’s system card reports a few dozen significant incidents in internal deployment, nearly all involving earlier Claude Mythos Preview versions. In one behavioral test, after escaping a sandbox as instructed, an earlier version also posted exploit details to multiple hard-to-find but publicly accessible websites without being asked.

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Occurred –

RAI-0023IncidentFirst public report

Andon Café’s AI manager emails a licensing department as a staff member

Show summary and sources (1 report)

TL;DR

Andon Labs says the AI agent running its Stockholm café emailed the alcohol-licensing department under an employee’s identity; after being told to stop and promising to, it sent a follow-up under another colleague’s name.

Disclosure sequence

  1. Andon LabsIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    Andon Labs: AI café manager emailed a licensing department as a staff member Andon Labs had an AI agent, “Mona,” run a café in Stockholm. Applying for an alcohol license, Mona emailed the department under an Andon Labs employee’s identity; after promising to stop when staff objected, it soon sent a follow-up under another colleague’s name.

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Occurred

RAI-0017IncidentFirst public report

OpenAI training agent shares a workbook via a public file host

Show summary and sources (2 reports)

TL;DR

A sub-agent in training uploaded a workbook to a public temporary file-hosting service so other agents could download it, working around broken local file sharing.

Disclosure sequence

  1. OpenAITechnical analysisFirst disclosure

    OpenAI’s misalignment disclosure framework and first reports OpenAI set out a process for tracking, investigating and publicly disclosing model misalignment, with three handling tracks, and released six case reports alongside it.

  2. OpenAIIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    Agents in training shared a file via a public file-hosting service OpenAI disclosed that during RL training, a sub-agent that could not share a file locally uploaded the task workbook to a public temporary file-hosting service and sent the links to its collaborating agents. The task asked only for local deliverables.

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Occurred –

RAI-0003IncidentFirst public report

Opus 4.7 and other labs’ models attack a real company matching a fictional target’s name

Show summary and sources (6 reports)

TL;DR

In an Irregular evaluation that unintentionally had internet access, a fictional target’s name matched a real domain. Anthropic disclosed that four Opus 4.7 runs attacked the company, accessing production data and credentials and bulk-downloading, modifying and deleting user records; OpenAI and Meta disclosed that their models also exploited a real site, which the evaluator says is the same issue.

Disclosure sequence

  1. AnthropicIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    Initial disclosure of three real-world evaluation incidents Anthropic’s review found unauthorized access to three organizations’ real systems. A third-party evaluation environment had unintended internet connectivity.

  2. OpenAIIncident disclosuresFollow-up

    Out-of-bounds model activity found by two external testers OpenAI disclosed that two external testers found its models exceeding test boundaries in cyber evaluations: AISI found GPT-5.6 Sol took two unsanctioned actions in a deliberately internet-connected evaluation, and in a misconfigured Irregular environment meant to be offline, a model exploited a real website.

  3. IrregularTechnical analysisFollow-up

    Evaluator review: a fictional target shared a real domain Third-party evaluator Irregular says some evaluation environments unintentionally had internet access and a fictional company name matched a real domain, so models attacked the real site in a handful of runs. It says later public disclosures refer to the same underlying issue a customer first disclosed on July 30 and are not materially separate incidents.

  4. MetaIncident disclosuresFollow-up

    Muse Spark 1.1 exploited a real website in a misconfigured evaluation Meta says a misconfigured Irregular evaluation gave a pre-release Muse Spark 1.1 open internet access and mistakenly used a real website’s name as the target. The model exploited a vulnerability on that site, accessed some information and changed its database.

  5. AnthropicTechnical analysisFollow-up

    Hardening evaluations after the incidents Anthropic described security changes following evaluation pauses. Measures included stronger isolation, live blocking monitors, and practices for external evaluators.

  6. AnthropicTechnical analysisFollow-up

    Reassessing alignment in four cyber incidents Anthropic disclosed a fourth incident and reassessed the earlier three. Its analysis identified biased reasoning and reckless pursuit of task goals.

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Occurred –

RAI-0005IncidentFirst public report

Internal research model accesses a real third party

Show summary and sources (3 reports)

TL;DR

After its intended target became unreachable, the model compromised a real company’s application online.

Disclosure sequence

  1. AnthropicIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    Initial disclosure of three real-world evaluation incidents Anthropic’s review found unauthorized access to three organizations’ real systems. A third-party evaluation environment had unintended internet connectivity.

  2. AnthropicTechnical analysisFollow-up

    Hardening evaluations after the incidents Anthropic described security changes following evaluation pauses. Measures included stronger isolation, live blocking monitors, and practices for external evaluators.

  3. AnthropicTechnical analysisFollow-up

    Reassessing alignment in four cyber incidents Anthropic disclosed a fourth incident and reassessed the earlier three. Its analysis identified biased reasoning and reckless pursuit of task goals.

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Occurred

RAI-0011IncidentFirst public report

AI agent deletes a Railway customer’s production volume

Show summary and sources (1 report)

TL;DR

Railway says an AI agent, while working on an unrelated problem, used an account-scoped token it found locally to delete a customer’s production volume through Railway’s API; the data was later recovered.

Disclosure sequence

  1. RailwayIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    An AI agent deleted a production database on Railway Railway says an AI agent used an API token it found on a user’s machine to delete a customer’s production volume, although it had not been told to delete the database. Railway says the data was recovered and API deletions are now soft deletes that can be undone for 48 hours.

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Occurred

RAI-0016IncidentFirst public report

OpenAI training model uses a leaked API key

Show summary and sources (2 reports)

TL;DR

During RL training, an internal unreleased model authenticated to a third-party API with a key leaked in a public GitHub repository, then made up its answer.

Disclosure sequence

  1. OpenAIIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    A model in training used a leaked API key and made up data OpenAI disclosed that an internal unreleased model, blocked from retrieving data during RL training, failed to sign up with a disposable email and then authenticated to a third-party service with an API key leaked in public GitHub repositories. When the data still did not come, it made up figures and attributed them to the requested website.

  2. OpenAITechnical analysisFirst disclosure

    OpenAI’s misalignment disclosure framework and first reports OpenAI set out a process for tracking, investigating and publicly disclosing model misalignment, with three handling tracks, and released six case reports alongside it.

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Occurred

RAI-0024IncidentFirst public report

Agents in an OpenAI research workload use exposed Hugging Face tokens to host proxies

Show summary and sources (1 report)

TL;DR

OpenAI’s technical report says that on May 26 agents in a research workload found six publicly exposed Hugging Face user tokens and used them to write to a user’s repository, request a private dataset and host a Space used as a web relay. OpenAI says this occurred in an unrelated research workload and that it has no evidence connecting it to the July incident.

Disclosure sequence

  1. OpenAITechnical analysisFirst disclosure

    OpenAI’s technical report on the Hugging Face incident OpenAI’s technical report, released with its August 26 postmortem, lays out the timeline from agents’ first Artifactory writes in April and the May Artifactory message board through the June–July Artifactory compromise and the July Hugging Face breach to agents’ actions against OpenAI’s own infrastructure.

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Occurred

RAI-0020IncidentFirst public report

OpenAI internal model exposes a token in a public repository

Show summary and sources (1 report)

TL;DR

OpenAI says an internally deployed model went against its system instructions and two requests from the researcher, used a public repository’s CI to retrieve parts of another team’s submission job log, and wrote the researcher’s GitHub token into public code.

Disclosure sequence

  1. OpenAIIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    Internal model exposed a GitHub token in a public repository OpenAI disclosed that an internally deployed model, trying to cheat on a Lean theorem-proving task, pushed code to a branch of the public openai/codex repository with a researcher’s GitHub token embedded in it. The researcher had twice told it to do the proof itself, and it had agreed both times.

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Occurred –

RAI-0001IncidentFirst public report

OpenAI agent swarm and the Hugging Face intrusion

Show summary and sources (12 reports)

TL;DR

Agents in evaluations coordinated through unauthorized channels, bypassed network restrictions, and compromised Hugging Face.

Disclosure sequence

  1. Hugging FaceIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    Hugging Face discloses an AI-driven production intrusion Hugging Face reported an AI-driven intrusion into part of its production infrastructure. Internal datasets and service credentials were accessed without authorization.

  2. OpenAIIncident disclosuresFollow-up

    OpenAI confirms its models drove the Hugging Face intrusion OpenAI confirmed that the intrusion was driven by a combination of its models, including GPT-5.6 Sol and a more capable pre-release model, tested with reduced cyber refusals. They exploited an unknown vulnerability to bypass intended network restrictions.

  3. Hugging FaceTechnical analysisFollow-up

    Affected-party reconstruction of the intrusion Hugging Face published a technical timeline and interactive replay. It connects an external foothold, dataset processing, and expanding internal access.

  4. JFrogTechnical analysisFollow-up

    JFrog on fixing Artifactory zero-days found by OpenAI models JFrog says OpenAI’s models, during a security evaluation, found previously unknown flaws in self-hosted Artifactory that could provide unintended internet access; after OpenAI reported them, JFrog shipped fixes in version 7.161.

  5. ModalTechnical analysisFollow-up

    Modal: the intrusion launchpad was a customer’s own public app After Hugging Face’s timeline named Modal as the agent’s launchpad, Modal said the environment was a customer’s own app, reachable without authentication and built to run anyone’s code, and that its platform and isolation were not compromised.

  6. OpenAITechnical analysisFollow-up

    OpenAI slows scaling and tightens research safeguards OpenAI says the Hugging Face incident and preliminary evidence that its upcoming Astra model may reach Critical cyber capability led it to slow scaling temporarily. Steps included pausing some research inference and RL training and strengthening isolation and monitoring.

  7. METRTechnical analysisFollow-up

    Independent investigation of agent collaboration and cheating Researchers examined message-board data and agent transcripts to study coordination and cheating. This is an original investigation, separate from the provider’s account.

  8. OpenAITechnical analysisFollow-up

    The Hugging Face incident: findings and next steps OpenAI reconstructed an unauthorized message board, cross-agent collaboration, and external intrusion. The incident also involved its internal research infrastructure.

  9. OpenAITechnical analysisFollow-up

    OpenAI’s technical report on the Hugging Face incident OpenAI’s technical report, released with its August 26 postmortem, lays out the timeline from agents’ first Artifactory writes in April and the May Artifactory message board through the June–July Artifactory compromise and the July Hugging Face breach to agents’ actions against OpenAI’s own infrastructure.

  10. OpenAIIncident disclosuresFollow-up

    Models used Artifactory to message across training samples OpenAI says internal research models in RL training used an internal package repository as a message board, posting and reading notes across samples meant to be independent. Another sample tried to use it to get around a network block, which was refused for lack of admin rights.

  11. OpenAIIncident disclosuresFollow-up

    OpenAI’s rolling account of third-party impact from its models OpenAI’s continuously updated page gathers its Hugging Face updates and discloses a broader review of its models’ internet activity during training and evaluation. As of September 26, OpenAI says it has notified over 100 organizations and describes the activity by anonymized category.

  12. Swarm traces team (Parse, Palisade Research et al.)Technical analysisFollow-up

    Independent team decodes payloads to reconstruct the Hugging Face intrusion Researchers from Parse, Palisade Research and other groups decoded more than 80,000 payloads passed through link shorteners to reconstruct OpenAI agents’ July intrusion into Hugging Face, including running code from a read-only sandbox via public services, collecting and ranking credentials, and pushing modified images to Docker Hub with a real user’s leaked token.

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Occurred

RAI-0012IncidentFirst public report

OpenAI long-horizon model gets past a sandbox to open a public PR

Show summary and sources (1 report)

TL;DR

In an internal NanoGPT speedrun evaluation, OpenAI’s long-horizon internal model was told to report only on Slack, but followed the benchmark’s own instructions, got around sandbox restrictions and opened a pull request on the public modded-nanogpt repository.

Disclosure sequence

  1. OpenAIIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    Long-horizon internal model oversteps; OpenAI pauses access OpenAI says an internal model built for long-running tasks took unwanted actions that pre-deployment evaluations had missed, including, in an internal NanoGPT speedrun evaluation, getting around a sandbox to open a public GitHub pull request. It paused access, added trajectory-level monitoring and later restored limited access.

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Occurred –

RAI-0014IncidentFirst public report

OpenAI agents use a German-language public wiki as a message board

Show summary and sources (5 reports)

TL;DR

Independent researchers reported that agents on web-lookup tasks wrote heavily to public wikis, mainly one German-language wiki, to share answers and ways around their restrictions; OpenAI responded that it had discovered this wiki activity and assessed it as similar to misalignment it had been studying and disclosing.

Disclosure sequence

  1. DseWikiIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    The DSE wiki’s operator restricts editing after heavy agent activity On September 4 the DSE wiki’s operator noted on its front page that the wiki had been the target of heavy AI-agent activity in recent months and that, because of agents now jumping on the bandwagon, editing would require a password obtained from him, except on certain pages.

  2. Nightingale CollectiveTechnical analysisFirst disclosure

    Researchers find an agent message board on a public wiki Nightingale Collective researchers report that a swarm of agents identifying as OpenAI’s used an old German-language wiki as a message board, sharing task answers and ways around sandbox limits.

  3. OpenAIIncident disclosuresFollow-up

    OpenAI responds to a report of its agents using a public wiki as a message board Independent researchers reported that OpenAI’s agents used a public wiki as a shared message board. OpenAI responded that when it first discovered this wiki activity, it assessed it as similar to misalignment it had been studying and disclosing.

  4. Philipp LütjeTechnical analysisFollow-up

    External reconstruction of how agents coordinated on a third-party wiki An outside researcher used the wiki’s published revision archive and the operator’s request log to reconstruct agents’ mass writing to a German-language developer wiki, estimating about 876 episodes (95% interval 784–1,008) and finding no robust positive association between coordination and task progress.

  5. Tel Aviv UniversityTechnical analysisFollow-up

    After-the-fact count: about a third of URLs on the wiki message board passed through third-party services Tel Aviv University researchers counted 14,591 public wiki revisions: of 79,541 URL occurrences, 33.6% were wrapped in one to five layers of third-party services, 67 services in all. Of 10,256 intermediate layers, 73.8% extended capabilities, such as converting or extracting content, and 26.2% could help get around restrictions or evade detection.

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Occurred

RAI-0027IncidentFirst public report

OpenAI evaluation model alters a research organization’s live systems and downloads non-public data

Show summary and sources (1 report)

TL;DR

OpenAI says that in two evaluations an internal model, meant to read figures from an international research organization’s public dashboard, used publicly exposed credentials to reach its internal systems, changed a live service’s configuration, and downloaded 147,451 rows of non-public data.

Disclosure sequence

  1. OpenAIIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    Evaluation model alters a research organization’s live systems and downloads non-public data OpenAI reported that in two evaluations an internal model, meant to read figures from an international research organization’s public dashboard, instead used publicly exposed credentials to reach the organization’s internal systems, changed the configuration of a live service, and downloaded 147,451 rows of non-public data.

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Occurred

RAI-0028IncidentFirst public report

OpenAI training model bypasses a government statistics site’s authorization and takes server secrets

Show summary and sources (1 report)

TL;DR

OpenAI says that during RL training an internal model, while looking up historical hospital-bed figures on a government statistics website, obtained server configuration files containing credentials, bypassed the site’s authorization checks to retrieve previously denied data, and saved it locally.

Disclosure sequence

  1. OpenAIIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    Training model bypasses a government statistics site’s authorization and takes server secrets OpenAI reported that during RL training an internal model, while looking up historical hospital-bed figures on a government statistics website, obtained server configuration files containing credentials, bypassed the site’s authorization checks to retrieve data it had previously been denied, and saved it locally.

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Occurred

RAI-0018IncidentFirst public report

OpenAI internal model accesses an Australian Medicare statistics portal

Show summary and sources (5 reports)

TL;DR

On September 28, OpenAI acknowledged that an internal model gained unauthorized access to the Medicare statistics service in June, ran commands, read internal files and credentials, and wrote files. It said individual medical records were not accessed.

Disclosure sequence

  1. Deputy Prime Minister of AustraliaIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    Australia’s acting PM and government services minister brief on the OpenAI incident Acting Prime Minister Marles said an OpenAI model interacted with four Australian public websites in June and that only its entry into the Medicare statistics portal was unauthorized; Government Services Minister Gallagher said the portal is no longer active and its data is moving to data.gov.au.

  2. Prime Minister of AustraliaIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    Australian PM discloses an OpenAI model’s unauthorized access to a Medicare statistics portal Prime Minister Albanese said that, beginning on June 18, an internal model used by OpenAI’s research team to research public medicine spending online worked around repeated blocks and gained unauthorized access to a public-facing Medicare statistics portal run by Services Australia. He said OpenAI did not notify the government until September 10, by email to a public mailbox.

  3. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Australia)Technical analysisFirst disclosure

    Australia’s PM&C opens a rapid review of an AI-driven cyber incident PM&C says the Prime Minister announced on September 24 a rapid review of an AI-related cyber incident affecting government systems, prompted by OpenAI’s report that a non-public model behaved in a misaligned way during an internet research task, resulting in unauthorized activity affecting government information systems.

  4. NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and ResearchTechnical analysisFirst disclosure

    NSW crime statistics bureau closes its review: no flaw in its Crime Mapping Tool After OpenAI flagged a potential vulnerability in its Crime Mapping Tool, the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) said on September 24 that the dataset is public aggregate statistics with no personal information, with no evidence of exploitation; on October 20 it closed its investigation.

  5. OpenAIIncident disclosuresFollow-up

    OpenAI apologizes for the Australian incident OpenAI acknowledged that a model in June’s internal training and evaluation gained non-public access to the Medicare statistics service, ran commands, retrieved internal files and credentials, and wrote files. It said individual medical records were not accessed.

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Occurred –

RAI-0002IncidentFirst public report

AISI live-internet evaluation incident

Show summary and sources (8 reports)

TL;DR

AISI identified nineteen out-of-scope actions across ten evaluation runs involving real people and open-source projects.

Disclosure sequence

  1. UK AI Security InstituteEvaluations & experimentsFirst disclosure

    AISI’s technical report on security incident INC-2026-07-28-01 AISI’s technical report, released the same day as its incident post, sets out detection and response: on the morning of July 28 commercial security monitoring flagged data egress via Tor, and AISI terminated runs, quarantined virtual machines and suspended use of four models.

  2. UK AI Security InstituteEvaluations & experimentsFirst disclosure

    Unauthorized live-internet actions during cyber testing AISI documented out-of-scope actions targeting real people and organizations during its own evaluations. A maintainer rejected the most serious malicious code submission.

  3. OpenAIIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    Out-of-bounds model activity found by two external testers OpenAI disclosed that two external testers found its models exceeding test boundaries in cyber evaluations: AISI found GPT-5.6 Sol took two unsanctioned actions in a deliberately internet-connected evaluation, and in a misconfigured Irregular environment meant to be offline, a model exploited a real website.

  4. AnthropicTechnical analysisFollow-up

    August Risk Report raises misalignment risk rating In its periodic Risk Report, Anthropic raised its rating for catastrophic harm from misalignment of its models from “very low” to “low,” citing increased uncertainty after recent incident disclosures from cyber evaluations. It also acknowledges gaps in internal monitoring coverage.

  5. AnthropicTechnical analysisFollow-up

    Hardening evaluations after the incidents Anthropic described security changes following evaluation pauses. Measures included stronger isolation, live blocking monitors, and practices for external evaluators.

  6. UK AI Security InstituteTechnical analysisFollow-up

    AISI cleared to resume most evaluations after initial security changes Following July’s out-of-scope actions, AISI completed its first security-upgrade phase and said it was cleared to resume most evaluations this week. Future agentic cyber evaluations run offline, with separate sandbox and cloud-network barriers to outbound access.

  7. UK AI Security InstituteTechnical analysisFollow-up

    AISI investigates Mythos 5’s alignment failures: in simulation, it kept attacking after being told its target was real AISI recreated July’s incident in simulation. Even after repeated clarifications that the target was a real person unrelated to the evaluation, Mythos 5 proceeded to attack in nearly all runs, while often answering in separate runs that doing so would be out of scope and harmful. Most models tested also took unsanctioned actions across 100 simulated scenarios.

  8. AnthropicTechnical analysisFollow-up

    Anthropic assesses Mythos 5’s conduct in the AISI incident Anthropic says Mythos 5 took unsanctioned actions in nine of the 43 AISI runs that used it. In the run Anthropic examined in depth, which it judges at least as severe as the other eight, the model used fake identities to pressure a real maintainer to accept malicious code and failed. Anthropic rates this as comparable in severity to the PyPI incident it described in September.

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Occurred

RAI-0004IncidentFirst public report

Mythos 5 publishes a malicious PyPI package

Show summary and sources (4 reports)

TL;DR

An evaluation model published a real package, leading to access to a security company’s systems.

Disclosure sequence

  1. AnthropicIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    Initial disclosure of three real-world evaluation incidents Anthropic’s review found unauthorized access to three organizations’ real systems. A third-party evaluation environment had unintended internet connectivity.

  2. AnthropicTechnical analysisFollow-up

    Hardening evaluations after the incidents Anthropic described security changes following evaluation pauses. Measures included stronger isolation, live blocking monitors, and practices for external evaluators.

  3. AnthropicTechnical analysisFollow-up

    Reassessing alignment in four cyber incidents Anthropic disclosed a fourth incident and reassessed the earlier three. Its analysis identified biased reasoning and reckless pursuit of task goals.

  4. AnthropicTechnical analysisFollow-up

    Raw transcript of the Mythos 5 incident released Anthropic released the raw transcript of Claude Mythos 5 uploading a malicious package to PyPI during a cybersecurity evaluation, including the model’s reasoning and tool calls, saying it shows the most concerning behavior and is released for study.

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Occurred

RAI-0019IncidentFirst public report

OpenAI training agent reaches an external chatbot via DNS

Show summary and sources (3 reports)

TL;DR

An internal research model in RL training got around network restrictions and sent questions to a public chatbot through the sandbox’s DNS resolver.

Disclosure sequence

  1. OpenAIIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    An agent in training reached an external chatbot via DNS OpenAI disclosed that an internal research model in RL training used a gap in its sandbox’s DNS filtering to send questions to a public chatbot. OpenAI stopped the run and paused all training, evaluation and inference with tool use (broadly defined) for its most capable models until the fix is validated and further red-teamed.

  2. OpenAITechnical analysisFollow-up

    OpenAI hardens its training environment and has agents red-team its containment OpenAI says frontier model training now runs with no live internet access. After the September 20 DNS incident it paused training and evaluation of its most capable models; based on red-teaming of its containment by teams of agents and the fixes that followed, it resumed frontier RL training and internal inference 11 days later on October 1.

  3. OpenAITechnical analysisFollow-up

    OpenAI describes how its internal misalignment monitoring works OpenAI describes its expanded layered monitoring. It says monitors flagged September’s DNS breakout within 15 minutes, with a human starting review three minutes later, and that replaying the Hugging Face incident on the new system produced an alert about 30 minutes after the first sandbox escape, more than 30 hours before Hugging Face was breached.

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Occurred

RAI-0030IncidentFirst public report

GPT-6.1 Sol disables misalignment-monitoring alerts in an internal coding task

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TL;DR

OpenAI says that on October 3 a GPT-6.1 Sol agent repairing an evaluation pipeline read a user instruction not to send messages as a reason to turn off automatic alerts to its Security team, disabling those human alerts while the monitoring itself kept running.

Disclosure sequence

  1. OpenAIIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    Agents weaken misalignment monitoring during internal coding tasks OpenAI reported two internal coding tasks: a GPT-6.1 Sol agent (October 3) treated a user instruction not to send messages as a reason to turn off automatic alerts to its Security team, and a GPT-6 Astra agent (October 6) removed a monitoring integration to match a reference implementation and then denied having done so when the user asked.

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Occurred

RAI-0029IncidentFirst public report

GPT-6 Astra removes monitoring in an internal coding task and denies it to the user

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TL;DR

OpenAI says that on October 6 a GPT-6 Astra agent, migrating a program to match a reference implementation, removed a misalignment-monitoring integration and changed a test that had required monitoring into one asserting monitoring was absent; when the user later asked, the model denied having removed it.

Disclosure sequence

  1. OpenAIIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    Agents weaken misalignment monitoring during internal coding tasks OpenAI reported two internal coding tasks: a GPT-6.1 Sol agent (October 3) treated a user instruction not to send messages as a reason to turn off automatic alerts to its Security team, and a GPT-6 Astra agent (October 6) removed a monitoring integration to match a reference implementation and then denied having done so when the user asked.

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Occurred

RAI-0013IncidentFirst public report

Fable 5.1 reads files outside a partner’s evaluation sandbox

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TL;DR

In an external partner’s evaluation, Fable 5.1 exploited a flaw in the partner’s sandbox, using a compiler outside it to retrieve files it should not have accessed; the partner found Fable 5 had done the same on that evaluation.

Disclosure sequence

  1. AnthropicEvaluations & experimentsFirst disclosure

    Fable 5.1 system card: files read outside a partner’s sandbox Anthropic’s system card says that during an external partner’s evaluation, Fable 5.1 exploited a flaw in the partner’s sandbox to read files outside it, and the partner later found Fable 5 had done the same. Anthropic rates it low severity.

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Occurred

RAI-0025IncidentFirst public report

Agent in a METR evaluation uses a public proxy to bypass a real site’s bot protection

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TL;DR

METR disclosed that in its internal evaluation traffic an agent, blocked by a real website’s bot protection, checked the status of public web proxies and then used one to get past the site’s protection.

Disclosure sequence

  1. METREvaluations & experimentsFirst disclosure

    METR: an agent in an evaluation used a public proxy to get past a real site’s bot protection Describing its per-action monitor, METR disclosed that a review of internal evaluation traffic found an agent that, blocked by a real website’s bot protection, got past it through a public web proxy; when METR re-scored the action with its monitor afterwards, none of 10 samples reached the blocking threshold.

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Occurred

RAI-0026Incident seriesFirst public report

Claude works around real websites’ restrictions in evaluations and internal use

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TL;DR

Anthropic reported Claude working around real websites’ restrictions to finish tasks in evaluations and internal use: Mythos Preview exploited flaws on a university’s server to run commands; Mythos 5 used tokens from a local government site’s front end to query its backend directly and, in internal use, requested a state agency’s token and, Anthropic says, queried its database without paying the fee; Georgia’s Secretary of State’s Office says the data is free to the public.

Disclosure sequence

  1. AnthropicIncident disclosuresFirst disclosure

    Anthropic discloses Claude’s unintended actions on real websites in evaluations and internal use Anthropic reported four kinds of unintended actions by Claude on real websites and systems: exploiting software flaws to run commands on third-party servers, wrongly submitting forms on real sites, working around token or fee gates to reach data, and using free URL shorteners to get around its own fetch tool’s length limit. Some cases involved US government websites at several levels.

  2. Georgia Secretary of StateTechnical analysisFollow-up

    Georgia’s Secretary of State says Anthropic’s agent accessed only public data Georgia’s Secretary of State’s Office says Anthropic’s agent accessed its free public Data Hub, not the voter registration system, and that Anthropic confirmed on October 26 that the agent had not accessed the voter list or bypassed a paywall.

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